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REMOVING THE ROADBLOCK TO 
INTERVENTION OF RIGHT: WILDERNESS 
SOCIETY v. U.S. FOREST SERVICE AND THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION TO ABANDON 
ITS FEDERAL DEFENDANT RULE 
Abstract: In 2011, in Wilderness Society v. U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit abandoned its unique federal defendant 
rule, which prohibited any non-federal entity from intervening of right to 
defend the federal government’s decisions under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit ensured that its 
typical, liberal intervention of right standard applied equally to all pro-
posed intervenors. This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit rightfully 
recognized that the practical realities of NEPA litigation and its own in-
tervention policies require a broad and flexible approach to intervention 
of right, rather than the federal defendant rule’s categorical prohibition. 
Introduction 
 The injuries and consequences of a lawsuit often extend beyond 
the plaintiff and defendant of that suit.1 Those consequences can be 
especially far-reaching in environmental litigation, because environ-
mental suits can affect many stakeholders and can have broad effects 
on legal entitlements.2 Typically, therefore, to join a suit impacting 
their interests, third parties can make a motion to intervene of right.3 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See Jean L. Doyle, Note, Federal Rule 24: Defining Interest for Purposes of Intervention of 
Right by an Environmental Organization, 22 Val. U. L. Rev. 109, 109 (1987); Stephanie D. 
Matheny, Note, Who Can Defend a Federal Regulation? The Ninth Circuit Misapplied Rule 24 by 
Denying Intervention of Right in Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 78 Wash. L. Rev. 1067, 
1073–74 (2003). 
2 See Stuart Spencer, Note, Sierra Club v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: Inter-
vention of Right and the Victories That Come Back to Haunt, 7 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 271, 274 (1993); 
see, e.g., Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (deter-
mining the validity of the U.S. Forest Service’s “Roadless Rule” that limited road construc-
tion on over fifty-eight million acres of national forests), abrogated by Wilderness Soc’y v. 
U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011); Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1480 
(9th Cir. 1993) (determining whether the EPA’s permits to the City of Phoenix waste water 
treatment plants, which allowed the plants to discharge toxic pollutants into nearby rivers, 
violated the Clean Water Act), abrogated by Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 303 (9th Cir. 1989) (determining the 
claims of various environmental groups seeking to enjoin the Oregon Bureau of Land 
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 Until recently, however, the Ninth Circuit’s unique federal defen-
dant rule prohibited those with private interests from intervening of 
right as defendants in any claims arising out of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).4 Under this rule, only the federal 
government could defend a NEPA challenge, because only the federal 
government is liable under NEPA.5 Thus, private groups and local gov-
ernments could not intervene of right in any NEPA suit in the Ninth 
Circuit to make their interests and arguments heard.6 
 In 2011, in Wilderness Society v. U.S. Forest Service, the en banc U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit revisited the federal defendant 
rule and concluded that rather than retaining the rule’s categorical bar 
against intervention of right, it would permit private parties to inter-
vene in NEPA suits.7 It did so by reasoning that the federal defendant 
rule was irreconcilable with its own intervention of right standard and 
the intervention law of most circuits.8 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed its precedent and abandoned the federal defendant rule.9 
 Although the federal defendant rule was unique to the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the Wilderness Society decision was particularly important because 
the Ninth Circuit adjudicates the majority of the country’s environ-
mental litigation.10 The Ninth Circuit encompasses nine Western states 
and many of the country’s natural parks and resources.11 Consequently, 
                                                                                                                      
Management from harvesting and selling timber within the habitat of the northern spot-
ted owl), abrogated by Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011). 
3 See Gene R. Shreve, Questioning Intervention of Right—Toward a New Methodology of Deci-
sionmaking, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 894, 895–96 (1980); Doyle, supra note 1, at 111–12. Because 
intervention of right allows an individual or group to become an actual party to case with-
out undertaking the expense of filing a separate suit, one commentator has argued that 
“intervention is certainly the best choice for an environmental group that wants to take an 
active part in ongoing litigation.” Doyle, supra note 1, at 111–12. 
4 Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1176. 
5 Id. at 1177; see, e.g., Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at 1108; Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’s, 222 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000), abrogated by Wilderness Soc’y, 630 
F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011); Churchill Cnty. v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072, 1082–83 (9th Cir.), 
amended by 158 F.3d 491 (9th Cir. 1998); Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
66 F.3d 1489, 1499 n.11 (9th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 
2011); Sierra Club, 995 F.2d at 1485; Portland Audubon Soc’y, 866 F.2d at 303. 
6 See Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at 1108; Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1113–14; Chur-
chill Cnty., 150 F.3d at 1082–83; Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d at 1499 n.11; Sierra Club, 
995 F.2d at 1485. 
7 630 F.3d at 1177. 
8 Id. at 1178–80. 
9 Id. at 1180. 
10 Lawrence Hurley, Ruling Opens Door for Intervenors in Western NEPA Disputes, E&E 
Publ’g LLC ( Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2011/01/14/1. 
11 Id. 
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many environmental disputes, including NEPA suits, arise within the 
Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction.12 Thus, Wilderness Society marks an impor-
tant turning point for private groups affected by the government’s de-
cisions under NEPA.13 
 Part I of this Comment contextualizes Wilderness Society’s holding 
within the broader circuit court debate on the proper interpretation of 
intervention of right.14 Then, Part II outlines the Ninth Circuit’s reason-
ing for ultimately discarding the federal defendant rule and applying its 
broad intervention standard to NEPA cases.15 Finally, Part III argues that 
by abandoning the federal defendant rule the Ninth Circuit corrected 
an inconsistency in its intervention law and ensured that its typical, lib-
eral intervention standard applied equally to all proposed intervenors.16 
I. Wilderness Society and Conflicting Interpretations of 
Intervention of Right 
 The NEPA requires all federal agencies contemplating legislation 
to assess the environmental impact of that legislation and to review 
available alternatives in an environmental impact statement.17 If the 
agency produces an inadequate environmental impact statement, or 
fails to produce one, then a party may challenge the legislation to en-
join the government from executing it.18 Yet, government decisions 
that implicate NEPA also affect private groups or local governments 
that benefit from the governmental action.19 Consequently, private 
groups and local governments often seek to defend a federal agency’s 
                                                                                                                      
12 Id. 
13 See id.; Julie Weis, Intervention as of Right in NEPA Cases—Ninth Circuit Returns to the 
Fold, Trends: ABA Section of Env’t, Energy, & Resources, May-June 2011, at 12, 12–13. 
14 See infra notes 17–52 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 53–72 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 73–94 and accompanying text. 
17 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006); Jesse H. Alderman, Note, Crying Wolf: The Unlawful 
Delisting of Northern Rocky Mountain Gray Wolves from the Endangered Species Act Protections, 50 
B.C. L. Rev. 1195, 1198 n.23, 1205 n.96 (2009). 
18 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); Matheny, supra note 1, at 1072. NEPA, however, does not 
create a private cause of action. ONRC Action v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 150 F.3d 1132, 
1135 (9th Cir. 1998); Matheny, supra note 1, at 1072. Thus, to challenge the adequacy of an 
agency’s environmental impact statement, a party must claim the statement violates the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). ONRC Action, 150 F.3d at 1135; Matheny, supra note 
1, at 1072. The APA will invalidate an agency’s environmental impact statement if it is “ar-
bitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 
U.S.C. § 706 (2006); Matheny, supra note 1, at 1072. 
19 See Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1179–80 (quoting Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 157 
F.3d 964, 971 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
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actions in a NEPA claim.20 To have their interest and arguments heard, 
these private parties usually move to intervene of right under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2).21 
 Rule 24(a)(2) permits a party to intervene on the merits of its mo-
tion if the party meets certain requirements.22 One of these require-
ments is that a proposed intervenor must demonstrate a protectable in-
terest, that is, an “interest relating to the property or transaction that is 
the subject of the action.”23 Nonetheless, circuits are split on the extent 
to which intervention as a matter of right is permitted under 24(a)(2).24 
 The majority of courts take a liberal view of “protectable interest,” 
allowing a party to intervene if that party demonstrates that some re-
lated interest would be harmed by the suit.25 Under this liberal view, 
intervention is constructed broadly to protect the interests of third par-
ties and promote judicial economy.26 Because under this approach an 
intervenor is not required to prove a particular legal interest, the inter-
vention standard is highly context specific.27 
 In contrast, a minority of courts more formalistic approach to 
24(a)(2) intervention, and require parties to show a direct cognizable 
legal interest.28 Under this approach, intervention is construed more 
narrowly to prevent unfairly burdening the named parties.29 Similar to 
                                                                                                                      
20 See Portland Audubon Soc’y, 866 F.2d at 303–04. 
21 See Shreve, supra note 3, at 895–96; Doyle, supra note 1, at 111–12. 
22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); Spencer, supra note 2, at 272. 
23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). 
24 Doyle, supra note 1, at 126–27; Spencer, supra note 2, at 273; Note, Federal Civil Proce-
dure: Intervention of Right Granted Private Party in Government Antitrust Suit Under New Rule 
24(a)(2), 1968 Duke L.J. 117, 124. 
25 Doyle, supra note 1, at 131. 
26 Id.; Spencer, supra note 2, at 273–74; see, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso 
Natural Gas Corp., 386 U.S. 129, 133–36 (1967); Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d at 1499 
n.11. 
27 Doyle, supra note 1, at 128; see, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Co., 
749 F.2d 968, 983 (2d Cir. 1984); Cnty. of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 
1980); Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 1977); Nuess v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 
(D.C. Cir. 1967). 
28 See Doyle, supra note 1, at 133; Spencer, supra note 2, at 275; see, e.g., Donaldson v. 
United States, 400 U.S. 517, 528–31 (1970), superseded by statute, I.R.C. §§ 7609(a), 7609(b) 
(2006), as recognized in Tiffany Fine Arts v. United States, 469 U.S. 310 (1985); United 
States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 858 (7th Cir. 1985); Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 
F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1982); Planned Parenthood of Minn., Inc. v. Citizens for Cmty. Ac-
tion, 558 F.2d 861, 869 (8th Cir. 1977). 
29 Doyle, supra note 1, at 133; Spencer, supra note 2, at 274; see, e.g., New Orleans Pub. 
Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 464 (5th Cir. 1984); Wilderness Soc’y 
v. Morton, 463 F.2d 1261, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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the standard in the more liberal approach, the standard in the conser-
vative approach is highly fact specific.30 
 When evaluating a 24(a)(2) motion, the Ninth Circuit requires a 
“‘significantly protectable’ interest relating to the property or transac-
tion which is the subject of the action.”31 In nearly all cases, the Ninth 
Circuit adopts a broad and flexible interpretation of this requirement 
in favor of intervention.32 Thus, a party may typically intervene if its 
related interests would be harmed by the pending action.33 
 Although in most cases the Ninth Circuit applied a liberal inter-
vention of right standard, the Ninth Circuit had one unique exception: 
its federal defendant rule.34 The federal defendant rule prohibited 
non-federal entities from intervening of right under Rule 24(a)(2) as 
defendants in claims arising out of NEPA.35 Defenders of the rule rea-
                                                                                                                      
 
30 Doyle, supra note 1, at 133–34 (noting that although conservative courts have similar 
standards for intervention of right, they can reach different results even under the same 
facts). 
31 Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1177. The significantly protectable interest requirement 
is one prong of the Ninth Circuit’s four part test for intervention. Id. To successfully inter-
vene a party must comply with the following requirements: 
(1) the motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must claim a “significantly 
protectable” interest relating to the property or transaction which is the sub-
ject of the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of 
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect 
that interest; and (4) the applicant’s interest must be inadequately repre-
sented by the parties to the action. 
Id. (quoting Sierra Club, 995 F.2d at 1481). 
32 Id. at 1179; United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 397 (9th Cir. 2002); Nw. 
Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 837 (9th Cir. 1996); Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1982); Nuess, 385 F.2d at 700. 
33 California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e 
have taken the view that a party has a sufficient interest for intervention purposes if it will 
suffer a practical impairment of its interests as a result of the pending litigation.”); Andrus, 
622 F.2d at 438; see Cindy Vreeland, Comment, Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation, 
and Federal Rule 24(a), 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 279, 289 (1990). 
34 Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1179 (“The ‘federal defendant’ rule’s limitation on in-
tervention of right in NEPA actions also runs counter to the standards we apply in all other 
intervention of right cases.”); Ruth Schimmel, Comment, Recent Developments in Environ-
mental Law: National Environmental Policy Act, 24 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 429, 429 (2011). 
35 Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1176; Portland Audubon Soc’y, 866 F.2d at 303. The federal 
defendant rule first originated in the Ninth Circuit’s 1989 case, Portland Audubon Society v. 
Hodel. Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1177; see Portland Audubon Soc’y, 866 F.2d at 303. In Port-
land Audubon Society, various environmental groups sought to enjoin the Oregon Bureau of 
Land Management from harvesting and selling timber in the northern spotted owl’s habi-
tat. 866 F.2d at 303. One issue was whether two timber interests, the Northeast Forest Re-
sources Council and a group of individual timber contractors, could intervene as defen-
dants in the NEPA claim. Id. at 308. The court held that although the timber interest 
groups had a substantial economic interest in the claim, this interest was insufficient to 
242 Boston College Law Review Vol. 53: E. Supp. 
soned that because only the federal government can violate NEPA, only 
federal entities have the requisite protectable interest.36 Therefore, al-
though the Ninth Circuit often permits liberal intervention in other 
cases, in NEPA cases it applies a more conservative standard.37 In Wil-
derness Society, the Ninth Circuit resolved this inconsistency by abandon-
ing the federal defendant rule.38 
 The dispute in Wilderness Society arose after the U.S. Forest Service 
approved 1196 miles of trails for motorized vehicles in the Minidoka 
Ranger District of the Sawtooth National Forest in Idaho.39 As a result 
of this proposed legislation, the Wilderness Society and Prairie Falcon 
Audubon, Inc. filed suit against the Forest Service.40 These groups ar-
gued that the Forest Service violated NEPA, and other environmental 
statutes, because it did not fully consider the adverse environmental 
effects that expanded motor vehicle access could have on the area.41 
 In response, three recreational groups—the Magic Valley Trail 
Machine Association, Blue Ribbon Coalition, Inc., and Idaho Recrea-
tion Council—sought to intervene of right as defendants in support of 
the Forest Service’s plan.42 The recreational groups represented the 
interests of individuals who used motor vehicles to access and enjoy 
Sawtooth National Forest.43 The groups argued that although they sup-
ported the Forest Service’s plan to allow expanded motor vehicle access 
in the area, the Forest Service, as a federal organization, could not 
adequately represent their private interests.44 
 The U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho, however, denied 
the recreational groups’ Rule 24(a)(2) motion, reasoning that the fed-
eral defendant rule barred private parties from intervening of right in 
                                                                                                                      
allow intervention of right because “NEPA provides no protection for purely economic 
interests.” Id. at 309. In subsequent years, the Portland Audubon Society decision became the 
basis for the Ninth Circuit’s strict federal defendant rule. Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1178. 
36 See, e.g., Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, 313 F.3d at 1108; Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 
113–14; Churchill Cnty., 150 F.3d at 1082–83; Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d at 1499 
n.11; Sierra Club, 995 F.2d at 1485. 
37 See Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1178–79; Spencer, supra note 2, at 275–76. 
38 See Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1176. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 See id. 
42Id. at 1176–77. 
43 Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV08-363-E-EJL, 2009 WL 453764, at *1 
(D. Idaho Feb. 20, 2009), rev’d en banc, 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011). 
44 Id. 
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NEPA cases.45 Following the rationale of the federal defendant rule, 
the court held that because the recreational groups were private par-
ties, they could not violate NEPA.46 Thus, they did not have a “signifi-
cant protectable interest” in the action.47 
                                                                                                                     
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, eliminating the federal de-
fendant rule.48 The court concluded that the federal defendant rule’s 
strict categorical prohibition on intervention of right conflicted with 
Rule 24(a)(2), the Ninth Circuit’s traditionally liberal policies toward 
intervention, and the intervention law of nearly all other circuits.49 Ac-
cordingly, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to 
reconsider the recreational groups’ motion to intervene.50 The Ninth 
Circuit instructed that, rather than applying the federal defendant rule 
to NEPA actions, the district court should apply the Ninth Circuit’s typi-
cal, case-specific intervention of right standard.51 Thus, in subsequent 
NEPA actions, the court should permit intervention when a party suffers 
harm to a legally protected and related interest.52 
II. The Court’s Rationale for Abandoning the Federal 
Defendant Rule 
 Ultimately, the Wilderness Society court abandoned the federal de-
fendant rule for three reasons.53 First, it concluded that the rule was 
inconsistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) because the 
federal defendant rule requires a proposed intervenor to demonstrate 
liability identical to the named defendant, rather than merely a related 
interest.54 Second, the court reasoned that the rule’s categorical bar 
against intervention of right for private interests was irreconcilable with 
the Ninth Circuit’s typical intervention standard, and the practical reali-
 
45 Id. at *2. The district court also denied permissive intervention under 24(b) because 
the Recreational Groups did not “add any further clarity or insight into the claims in this 
action.” Id. at *4. 
46 Id. at *2. 
47 Id. 
48 Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1177. 
49 Id. at 1178–80. 
50 Id. at 1180–81. 
51 Id. at 1180. 
52 Id. On remand the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho granted the Recrea-
tional Groups’ motion to intervene. Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV08-363-E-
EJL, 2011 WL 1743781, at *2 (D. Idaho May 5, 2011). 
53 See Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1178–80 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Benjamin E. Becker, Case Note, Wilderness Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 43 Urb. 
Law. 910, 910 (2011). 
54 See Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1178; infra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. 
244 Boston College Law Review Vol. 53: E. Supp. 
ties of NEPA cases.55 Finally, the court recognized that the rationale for 
the federal defendant rule lacked support in nearly all other circuits.56 
A. The Federal Defendant Rule and Rule 24(a)(2) 
 By abandoning the federal defendant rule and liberalizing its in-
tervention standard in NEPA actions, the Wilderness Society court sought 
to reconcile its intervention law with the plain language of Rule 
24(a)(2).57 The Wilderness Society court concluded that the federal de-
fendant rule conflicted with Rule 24(a)(2) because the federal defen-
dant rule required that a proposed intervenor of right face the same 
liability as the named defendant.58 In contrast, Rule 24(a)(2) requires 
only that an intervenor demonstrate “an interest relating to the prop-
erty or transaction that is the subject of the action.”59 Thus, as the Wil-
derness Society court noted, the federal defendant rule impermissibly 
focused on the underlying merits of the intervenor’s claim by requiring 
NEPA liability, rather than the intervenor’s interest in the subject mat-
ter of the case.60 
B. Creating a Consistent 24(a)(2) Intervention Standard 
 In addition, the Wilderness Society court also rejected the federal de-
fendant rule because the rule conflicted with the Ninth Circuit’s histori-
cally favorable polices toward intervention of right.61 Typically, the 
Ninth Circuit did not require a party to demonstrate a specific legal in-
terest to intervene, but rather weighed “practical and equitable consid-
erations,” in favor of intervention.62 The federal defendant rule, how-
ever, did not allow for this flexible analysis in NEPA actions; the rule 
automatically barred any private interest from intervening of right.63 
Thus, by abandoning the federal defendant rule and consistently apply-
ing the same liberal Rule 24(a)(2) intervention standard to all cases, the 
court sought to right this discrepancy within its own intervention law.64 
                                                                                                                      
55 See Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1179; infra notes 61–67 and accompanying text. 
56 See Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1180; infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. 
57 See 630 F.3d at 1178–79. 
58 Id. 
59 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). 
60 Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1178. 
61 Id. at 1179. 
62 Id. (quoting United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 397 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
63 Id. 
64 See id. 
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 Furthermore, the Wilderness Society court held that the federal de-
fendant rule’s strict prohibition on Rule 24(a)(2) intervention for pri-
vate parties ignores the practical ramifications of NEPA cases, which 
frequently involve and affect private interests.65 The court reasoned 
that although NEPA only binds the federal government, the environ-
mental implications of NEPA actions affect private parties and local 
governments.66 Thus, in contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s typical Rule 
24(a)(2) intervention standard, which weighs “practical and equitable 
considerations,” the federal defendant rule did not permit intervention 
based on such considerations, and instead ignored the practical realties 
of NEPA actions.67 
C. Conforming with the Majority Approach to 24(a)(2) Intervention 
 Finally, by abandoning the federal defendant rule in Wilderness So-
ciety, the Ninth Circuit sought to align its NEPA intervention of right 
standard with the more liberal approach to Rule 24(a)(2) intervention, 
followed by the majority of the circuits.68 Before Wilderness Society, the 
Ninth Circuit was the only circuit to adopt such a categorical prohibi-
tion on Rule 24(a)(2) intervention exclusively in NEPA actions.69 Al-
though the Seventh Circuit prohibits private parties from intervening 
of right in certain cases, this exclusion is not limited to NEPA actions.70 
Instead, the Seventh Circuit applies this prohibition in all cases in 
which only the federal government can be charged with compliance.71 
In contrast, other circuits have refused to adopt such a strict rule 
against Rule 24(a)(2) intervention in NEPA cases.72 
                                                                                                                      
65 Id. at 1180 (quoting Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 971 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
66 Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1179. 
67 Id. at 1179–80 (“Given the many different scenarios in which NEPA claims arise, 
courts should be permitted to engage in the contextual, fact-specific inquiry as to whether 
private parties meet the requirements for intervention of right on the merits, just as they 
do in all other cases.”). 
68 See Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1180; Matheny, supra note 1, at 1086. 
69 Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1180; see, e.g., WildEarth Guardian v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
573 F.3d 992, 995 (10th Cir. 2009); Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 971. 
70 Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1180; see Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 185 (7th 
Cir. 1982). 
71 See, e.g., Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1269 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. 36.96 
Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1985). 
72 Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1180; see, e.g., WildEarth Guardian, 573 F.3d at 995; 
Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 971. The Sixth and Second Circuits have explicitly declined to consider 
the issue. See Friends of Tims Ford v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 585 F.3d 955, 963 n.1 (6th Cir. 
2009); Pogliani v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 146 F. App’x 528, 529–30 (2d Cir. 2005). 
246 Boston College Law Review Vol. 53: E. Supp. 
III. The Implications of Wilderness Society 
 By eliminating the federal defendant rule and eliminating the dis-
tinction between intervention in NEPA actions and intervention in 
other environmental actions, the Ninth Circuit recognized that NEPA 
litigation requires a broad and flexible approach to intervention of 
right.73 Previously, the Ninth Circuit’s standard for intervention in 
NEPA actions was inconsistent with its standard under all other envi-
ronmental statutes.74 In NEPA actions, the federal defendant rule 
barred intervention by private actors; under the other statutes, how-
ever, the intervention standard permitted private parties to intervene 
of right.75 For example, the Ninth Circuit allowed non-federal entities 
to intervene as defendants in claims challenging federal compliance 
with the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,76 the Fed-
eral Endangered Species Act of 1973,77 and the Clean Water Act.78 
                                                                                                                      
73 See infra notes 74–94 and accompanying text. 
74 See Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2011); see, e.g., 
Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1397–98 (9th Cir. 1995); Sierra Club v. 
EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993), abrogated by Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d 1173 (9th 
Cir. 2011); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 526–28 (9th Cir. 1983). 
75 See Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1179; see, e.g., Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n, 58 F.3d at 
1397–98; Sierra Club, 995 F.2d at 1486; Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc., 713 F.2d at 526–28. 
76 Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc., 713 F.2d at 526–28. In 1983, in Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. 
Watt, the Ninth Circuit held that a conservation group could intervene of right to defend 
the Secretary of the Interior’s decision to create a bird sanctuary against plaintiff’s claims 
that such a project violated the Federal Land and Policy Act of 1976. 713 F.2d at 526, 527–
28; see Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1179. In granting intervention the court noted that 
“there can be no serious dispute” that the conservation groups demonstrated a signifi-
cantly protectable interest because “[a]n adverse decision in this suit would impair [the 
conservation group’s] interest in the preservation of birds and their habitat.” Sagebrush 
Rebellion, Inc., 713 F.2d at 528. 
77 Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n, 58 F.3d at 1397–98 (upholding intervention of right to en-
vironmental groups who sought to defend the Fish and Wildlife Service’s decision to list a 
species of snail as an endangered species). 
78 Sierra Club, 995 F.2d at 1486. In 1993, in Sierra Club v. EPA the Ninth Circuit held 
that the City of Phoenix should be allowed to intervene of right to defend the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) against allegations that the EPA’s permits to the city’s 
waste water treatment plants violated the Clean Water Act (CWA). 995 F.2d at 1480, 1483. 
The Sierra Club court attempted to reconcile its grant of intervention with the federal de-
fendant rule by reasoning that unlike NEPA regulations, CWA regulations can apply to 
private parties. Id. at 1485. Yet, as the Wilderness Society court noted, this attempt was un-
founded. See 630 F.3d at 1180. Whether a party faces liability under the statute in dispute is 
not a requirement for Rule 24(a)(2) intervention. Id. at 1179 (“[A] prospective interve-
nor’s asserted interest need not be protected by the statute under which the litigation is 
brought to qualify as ‘significantly protectable’ under Rule 24(a)(2).”). 
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Thus, in abandoning the federal defendant rule, Wilderness Society right-
fully corrected an inconsistency in its intervention law.79 
 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s categorical bar against interven-
tion by private interests in NEPA claims was fundamentally inconsistent 
with its intervention standard under other environmental statutes ad-
dressing the same policies and issues.80 Moreover, because NEPA and 
many environmental statutes share similar policy goals, environmental 
litigation frequently overlaps.81 As a consequence, prior to Wilderness 
Society, a private party’s right to intervene was based on the statute un-
der which the claim was brought, rather than the extent of that party’s 
interests in the litigation.82 
 Although the Ninth Circuit’s liberalization of its NEPA interven-
tion standard will make intervention of right easier for private parties, 
it will not open the floodgates to third party intervention.83 To inter-
vene of right a party must still prove harm to a legally protected and 
related interest.84 Therefore, private parties are not automatically 
granted intervention under the new standard.85 Instead, the abandon-
ment of the federal defendant rule means that third-party motions are 
not automatically dismissed.86 Thus, unlike the prior standard which 
required that the court dismiss a private party’s Rule 24(a)(2) motion 
no matter how great the potential harm to that party’s interest, the new 
standard permits the Ninth Circuit to consider the impact of a NEPA 
action on a particular defendant.87 
 Furthermore, although the new standard allows greater flexibility, 
it also helps to limit judicial discretion.88 The federal defendant rule 
categorically precluded private parties from intervening of right under 
Rule 24(a)(2) in NEPA actions.89 Yet, private parties could still seek 
                                                                                                                      
 
79 See Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1179; Doyle, supra note 1, at 1079–80. The Ninth Cir-
cuit also applied a liberal intervention standard in non-environmental cases, when the 
proposed intervenor could not face liability under the statute at issue. Matheny, supra note 
1, at 1080–81; see, e.g., Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 
627, 629–30 (9th Cir. 1982); Idaho v. Freedman, 625 F.2d 886, 887 (9th Cir. 1980). 
80 Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1179–80. 
81 See Spencer, supra note 2, at 284. 
82 See id. 
83 See Weis, supra note 13, at 13. 
84 Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1180. 
85 See id.; Weis, supra note 13, at 13; Hurley, supra note 10. 
86 See Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1179. 
87 See id.; Schimmel, supra note 35, at 432. 
88 See Matheny, supra note 1, at 1074–75, 1092. 
89 Id. at 1092; see, e.g., Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1108, 1110–
11 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Wilderness Soc’y, 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011); Wetlands 
Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000), abrogated 
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permissive intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b).90 
Unlike Rule 24(a)(2), which mandates intervention if a party meets the 
rule’s requirements, under 24(b) intervention is completely discretion-
ary.91 Consequently, the federal defendant rule left intervention for 
private parties and local governments in NEPA cases completely at the 
discretion of a specific judge.92 
 Moreover, the Wilderness Society court’s decision to abandon the 
federal defendant rule is particularly important because the Ninth Cir-
cuit encompasses nine Western States, and thus, many of the country’s 
national parks.93 Consequently, many environmental disputes and es-
pecially NEPA actions arise within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction; 
therefore, Wilderness Society rightfully allows many private parties and 
local governments the chance to have their interests represented in a 
Circuit that decides much of the nation’s NEPA litigation.94 
Conclusion 
 In Wilderness Society, the Ninth Circuit abandoned its unique fed-
eral defendant rule that categorically precluded private parties from 
intervening of right in NEPA actions. In its place, the court applied its 
typical, liberal intervention of right standard, which permits interven-
tion when the ongoing suit would harm a party’s legally protected and 
related interest. This broad and flexible approach to Rule 24(a)(2) in-
tervention more appropriately accounts for the practical realities of 
NEPA litigation, the text of Rule 24(a)(2), and the Circuit’s own inter-
vention polices. Furthermore, this change will help prevent the Ninth 
Circuit from arbitrarily distinguishing between NEPA actions and other 
environmental actions in permitting intervention. 
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